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FEDERAL CRIMINAL LITIGATION IN 20/20 VISION
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In this Article, the author examines three snapshots of the history of criminal
litigation in the federal courts, from the years 1968, 1988, and 2008, with a
view to predicting the future course of federal criminal adjudication. The
author examines three different aspects of federal criminal litigation at these
different points in time: 1) the volume and nature of federal criminal cases,
2) constitutional criminal procedure rules, and 3) federal sentencing,
highlighting trends and substantial changes in each of those areas.
Throughout the Article, the author notes the ways in which the future of
federal criminal litigation greatly depends upon the politics of the future,
including potential nominations to the federal judiciary by President Barack
Obama.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article was adapted from a speech given at the 40th anniversary
celebration of the Federal Judicial Center, hosted by Lewis & Clark Law
School in September, 2008, to congratulate the Federal Judicial Center
on forty years of excellent work. I would like to thank the Federal Judicial
Center too, personally as well as professionally. Over the past fifteen or
twenty years, I have enjoyed the opportunity on a number of occasions to
participate in programs run by Judge Rothstein and her fabulous staff. I
hope that the Center and the staff will continue to thrive for decades to
come.
In this Article, I look into the future of criminal litigation in the
federal courts, forecasting what challenges might confront the federal
. Centennial Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. B.A. 1968, Barnard
College;J.D. 1974, New York University School of Law. The author serves as President
of the American Civil Liberties Union. The author would like to thank Joel Petersen
and James Knox at Lewis and Clark Law Review and Brooklyn Law student Leila Hull
for their assistance in drafting the footnotes for this Article.
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courts and the Federal Judicial Center twenty years, or perhaps even forty
years from today. In order to do that, the best way is to start by looking
back into the past. The theme of the 40th anniversary celebration was
20/20 vision, and in this Article I proceed by comparing snapshots of
federal criminal litigation in 1968, the year in which the Federal Judicial
Center began, in 1988, twenty years later, and twenty years after that, in
2008, in three different areas: first, the volume and nature of federal
criminal litigation; second, a few aspects of constitutional criminal
procedure; and finally, federal criminal sentencing, an area where there
have been very dramatic changes in recent years. If hindsight, as the
saying goes, is always 20/20, studying the past should help us to project
what the future may hold.
II. CRIMINAL ADJUDICATION
The volume and nature of the criminal cases actually litigated in the
federal courts, of course, has a tremendous impact on the kinds of
challenges those courts will face. Recent data released by the Department
of Justice show that the number of federal criminal prosecutions in fiscal
year 2008, was 155,694.' This figure is about four and a half to five times
2the number of federal criminal cases prosecuted in 1968, and about
three and a half times the number of cases in 1988. 3
The number and the types of cases that end up in the federal courts
as criminal prosecutions depend on the fluctuating views of the political
branches on what is appropriate or necessary for the federal government
to do by way of federal criminal enforcement, as opposed to what is
appropriately left to the states. Congress or the Department of Justice
may choose to leave criminalization and enforcement decisions to the
states, which of course handle the bulk of criminal law policy and
enforcement, or may choose to enact and implement federal statutes
criminalizing particular conduct that is considered, for one reason or
another, to deserve or demand the attention of the federal government.
To use a metaphor that ran through the 2008 Federal Judicial Center
conference, federal judges may all be paddling their own canoes, but it is
Congress that decides whether those canoes will sit on a pastoral pond or
out on a wide and turbulent ocean.
The Constitution itself does not have very much to say about what
kind of criminal enforcement is to be done by the federal government.
Article I includes a few references to the idea that federal criminal
prosecution might be required to address harmful conduct affecting
federal interests-conduct like counterfeiting,4 which threatens money
TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (TRAC), PROSECUTIONS FOR
2008, http://tracfed.syr.edu/results/9x2049ccd32e45.html [hereinafter TRAC].
2 1 FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., WORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMMIrEE REPORTS, June
1, 1990, at 27-29. (32,571 criminal cases filed in federal court in 1968).
Id. (44, 585 criminal cases in federal court in 1988).
' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 6.
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coined by the federal government, or piracy.5 Early Congresses thought
there was some role for the federal government to play in criminal
enforcement under the Commerce Clause, but their view of the reach of
the Commerce Clause was quite limited. When I do research into early
cases about search and seizure, many of the cases involve ships on
navigable waters, because that was one of the few places where
international or interstate commerce was clearly involved. In those
circumstances, Congress believed that there was a role for the federal
government to play, even a century or two ago. Similarly, if counterfeiting
took place within the borders of some state, the federal government
would undertake responsibility for investigating and prosecuting such
crimes rather than allowing the states to address this conduct in whatever
manner they chose, because federal interests set out in Article I itself
were clearly involved.
The tremendous explosion in the federal criminal presence since
those early days is largely due to expansion in the reach of the
Commerce Clause during the twentieth century. This is standard history
that all law students learn in their first year of Constitutional Law.
Congress moved from deeming it a Commerce Clause matter if the
federal government wished to protect ships on navigable waters, to
creating a sheaf of statutes that punished a wide range of activities where
there was some tangible interstate nexus, like stolen securities or
prostitutes crossing state lines. 6 This type of conduct also came to be
treated as involving special federal interests not adequately addressed by
the states. The expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction did not end
there. In today's world, the federal government can enforce its drug laws,
for example, even in circumstances where the drugs involved never left
the state. After a brief period during which the Supreme Court evinced a
desire to rein in federal criminalization under the Commerce Clause,7
the Court recently endorsed this expansive view in the case of Gonzales v.
Raich.8 This was the medical marijuana case, which involved marijuana
plants being grown in the State of California and sold to California
neighbors pursuant to a state plan to dispense marijuana when a doctor
believed it was medically useful-to alleviate a glaucoma or cancer
patient's symptoms, for example. The Supreme Court ruled that it is
permissible for the federal government to use the Commerce Clause as a
basis for intervention, even where the controlled substance in question
remained at all times within the state of California, on the theory that any
marijuana transactions might potentially have an impact on a national
5 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
6 See Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74, 87 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 77 (2006)); White-Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825 (1910)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (2006)).
7 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549. 551 (1995); United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598, 598 (2000).
8 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005).
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marketplace for marijuana. 9 This enormous expansion in the scope of
federal drug enforcement is attributable partially to Congress passing
new statutes criminalizing drug offenses, and partially to expansive
prosecutorial ideas about what kind of enforcement should be done
under federal drug laws. Not only the politics in Congress, but the
politics of the current President and Attorney General affect the flow of
drug cases in federal court.
Another political decision that has a tremendous impact on what will
happen in the federal courts in an area like drug enforcement is the
composition of the federal budget. For example, when the Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA) was created in 1973, it started with 1,470
drug enforcement agents.' ° Today there are 5,235 drug enforcement
agents." It is axiomatic that the more investigation you buy, the more
prosecutions you will yield. So Congress can decide to increase the
number of drug prosecutions by budgeting more money for the DEA; or
the agency itself can decide to increase or reduce the number of drug
prosecutions by tailoring its own conduct.
Drug enforcement has been my chief example of federal crime so
far because it has been one of the major components of growth in the
federal docket. From comprising a rather small percentage of the federal
docket in 1968, by the 1980's, drug cases amounted to about twenty-one
percent of the federal criminal docket.12 More recently, they amounted to
about thirty-five percent of the federal criminal docket.13 So decisions made
by Congress, not only about what to criminalize in the statutes themselves,
but also about resources allocated to investigation and prosecution,
combined with the agency's and prosecutors' enforcement decisions, have
caused the federal courts to experience a tremendous and growing volume
of drug cases-currently amounting to about seventeen percent of the
federal criminal docket. 14 However, a new trend seems to be emerging that
may be rivaling drug enforcement in having a major impact on the kinds of
cases federal judges confront. There were some 155,694 federal criminal
cases in fiscal year 2008. 15 Analysis shows that many of those new cases were
referrals from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).' 6 Just when
federal drug prosecutions seem to be settling down, immigration
enforcement is on the rise, evidently fueling a twenty-seven and a half
' Id. at 2
'0 U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, DEA History, http://www.usdoj.gov/
dea/history.htm.
11 Id.
1 Bureau ofJustice Statistics Drug and Crime Facts: Drug Law Violations and
Pretrial Release, Prosecution and Adjudication, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/dcf/
ptrpa.htm#Fedpros.
'" Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC), Prosecutions for 2008,
http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/198.
"4 TRAC, supra note 1.
15 Id.
16 Id.
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percent increase in one year in the number of immigration offense cases on
the federal docket, which has greatly contributed to the overall increase in
the federal criminal caseload.17 As Dean Erwin Chemerinsky remarked at the
2008 conference, certain aspects of the approach of the DHS in its anti-
terrorism efforts are challenging our model of criminal jurisdiction."'
Instead of being backward looking, waiting for someone to commit a crime
and then prosecuting him or her for the crime, the DHS aims to prevent
terrorism-related crime. Most DHS cases that end up as federal prosecutions
are not prosecutions under terrorism-related statutes, but are prosecutions
for immigration violations.'9 The DHS seems to be focusing on immigration
enforcement as part of its forward-looking strategy to prevent terrorism.
Whether or not this strategy is effective can be debated; that the strategy has
an impact on the work of the federal courts is not debatable.
It is obvious in some respects how the types of cases being
prosecuted will change the types of challenges that arise for the federal
courts, and also for the Federal Judicial Center in doing the backup work
the courts will need. There are also less transparent ways in which the
changing nature of litigation can have pragmatic consequences for the
federal courts. One example may be an impact on plea rates. Judith
Resnik presented a chart during the conference showing how the
number of trials in federal court has gone down dramatically in the
criminal area, as well as the civil.20 In 1968, the year of the birth of the
Federal Judicial Center, about fifteen percent of criminal cases went to
trial.2' By 1988, that figure had gone down slightly, to about thirteen and
a half percent. Today the trial rate for defendants in federal criminal
cases is less than four percent.22 The fact that only four percent of
criminal cases go to trial has consequences, as Professor Resnik discussed,
for our very concept of the public administration of justice.23 It appears
that there may be a correlation between plea rates and the types of
offenses charged. According to recent figures, defendants in drug cases
go to trial about three percent of the time. 24 Defendants charged with
'7 James C. Duff, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 2008 Annual
Report of the Director, 226 tbl.D-2 (2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov
/judbus2008/appendices/D2CSepO8.pdf.
"a Erwin Chemerinsky, Founding Dean of the University of California, Irvine,
Law School, Address at Lewis & Clark Law School at the Conference Celebrating the
40th Anniversary of the FederalJudicial Center (Sep. 18, 2008).
" TRAC, supra note 1.
2 Judith Resnik, Arthur Liman Professor of Law, Yale Law School, Address at
Lewis & Clark Law School at the Conference Celebrating the 40th Anniversary of the
Federal Judicial Center (Sep. 18, 2008); Judith Resnik, Whither and Whether
Adjudication?86 B.U. L. REV. 1101, 1128 (2006).
2' David S. Clark, Adjudication to Administration: A Statistical Analysis of Federal
District Courts in the Twentieth Century, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 65, 140 (1981).
2 COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1998, at 31 tbl.3.1 (1992); Duff,
supra note 17, at 244 tbl.D-4.
2 Resnik, Address, supra note 20.
4 Duff, supra note 17, at 245 tbl.D-4.
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violent offenses, on the other hand, go to trial seven percent of the
time. That may not be an enormous difference in terms of absolute
numbers, but people who are charged with violent crimes go to trial two
to three times as often as people who are charged with drug offenses. It
would be interesting to study whether the much commented on death of
the trial is related, in some way, to the kinds of criminal cases that end up
predominating in federal criminal court.
Another pragmatic challenge that the federal courts are already
experiencing is the growth of multilingual proceedings. Given the
increase in the number of cases involving immigration offenses, and also
given the demographic trends in the population of this country, the
federal courts are likely to continue to experience many more cases in
26
which they will need the services of translators. Statistics from fiscal year
2008 show a fifteen percent increase over the previous year in court
events that require the use of interpreters. 27 That is a substantial increase.
The statistics also show that the number of different languages spoken by
people in federal court who might require interpreters has gone up to a
281recent high of 115. I talked about this problem with one federal judge
who sits in Orlando, Florida. He said that he really had no problem with
obtaining the services of interpreters because every time he needs an
interpreter, all he has to do is send over to Epcot Center. For judges who
do not sit near Epcot Center, access to qualified interpreters may pose
more of a challenge. And even when interpreters are accessible, the
Courtroom of Babel presents tremendous administrative challenges.
Another fact worthy of note is that the immigration cases are not
proportionately distributed throughout the country. Judges in the
Southwest are dealing with more of the immigration cases, and so are
experiencing more expansion of their dockets, and perhaps more
multilingual proceedings, than judges in most other parts of the
country. This disproportionate growth presents a different kind of
25 Duff, supra note 17, at 224 tbl.D-2..
26 The docket for fiscal year 2007 shows that forty-three percent of federal
criminal defendants were Hispanic. Out of the noncitizens, about eighty percent were
Hispanic. As the immigration docket started increasing, the percentage of defendants
with a less than high school education has increased again. UNITED STATES
SENTENCING COMMISSION, CHANGING FACE OF FEDERAL SENTENCING (2008), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/general/20081230-Changing-Face-Fed-Sent.pdf.
27 Press Release, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Court
Interpreting Events Increased in 2008, http://www.uscourts.gov/newsroom/
2009/interpreters.cfm.
2 Id. This marks an increase over even the past decade in the number of
languages requiring the use of interpreters in the federal courts. In 1999, district
courts reported needing interpretation for 103 foreign languages. Leonidas Ralph
Meacham, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 2000 Annual Report of the
Director 16 (2000), available at http:// vwww.uscourts.gov/library/dirrptOO/2000.pdf.
2' TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (TRAC), BUSH
ADMINISTRATION'S IMMIGRATION PROSECUTIONS SOAR: TOTAL OF ALL FEDERAL FILINGS
REACH NEw HIGH, http://trac.s)r.edu/tracreports/crim/201.
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administrative challenge to the federal courts and to the Federal Judicial
Center in providing appropriate support.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
In 1968, the year the Federal Judicial Center began, the Warren
Court was still going strong. By that year, the Warren Court had already
nationalized many provisions of the Bill of Rights and required the states
to provide the kinds of criminal procedure that the federal courts, for the
most part, had already been providing. The Court decided, in Mapp v.
Ohio, in 1961, to require the states to employ the exclusionary rule as a
remedy for violations of the Fourth Amendment. ° Gideon v. Wainwright,
in 1963, required the states to provide assigned counsel to indigent
criminal defendants charged with a felony.3 ' Miranda v. Arizona, in 1966,
recognized a constitutional right to remain silent and protected that
right by requiring police to advise suspects of their rights before
commencing a custodial interrogation.
As the times and the composition of the Court changed over the
next twenty years, many predicted that the Warren Court's criminal
procedure revolution would be dismantled. But by 1988, it was clear
that no real counter-revolution was occurring. The Supreme Court did
not overrule Mapp v. Ohio and eliminate the exclusionary rule. The Court
did not overrule Miranda v. Arizona, despite being given a clear
opportunity to do so. In fact, Chief Justice Rehnquist himself eventually
stabilized Miranda in the year 2000 in Dickerson v. United States, ruling that
Miranda did indeed have a constitutional foundation. 4 Nor did the
Court overrule Gideon v. Wainwright and excuse the states from paying for
legal counsel for the indigent. Instead, there was evolution in all of these
areas of criminal procedure, and in many others. The Supreme Court
created exceptions, reducing the scope of a wide range of constitutional
criminal procedure rights. Some blamed the incorporation of the Bill of
Rights for the shrinkage of constitutional rights previously afforded
federal criminal defendants. Justice Lewis Powell, in his opinion in
Johnson v. Louisiana,35 for example, predicted that the necessity of
formulating constitutional criminal procedure rules for the whole
country, and not just the federal courts, would lead the Supreme Court,
given its concern for federalism, to under-interpret the rights the Bill of
Rights had guaranteed federal criminal defendants.
'0 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
3' 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963).
3' 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1965).
33 See, e.g., Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Flow and Ebb of Constitutional Criminal
Procedure in the Warren and Burger Courts, 69 GEO. L.J. 151, 154 (1980).
" 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000).
406 U.S. 356, 375 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring); see also Apodaca v. Oregon,
406 U.S. 404 (1972).
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It is difficult to predict what the next twenty years will bring, even
after the historic presidential election of 2008. It remains to be seen how
the composition of the Supreme Court will develop and precisely how
these issues will be raised before the Court. Depending on these factors,
the long predicted counter-revolution could still occur, especially in the
Fourth Amendment area. In one recent case, Hudson v. Michigan, in
2006, four Justices of the Supreme Court expressed a great deal of doubt
about the validity of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule.' In
Hudson v. Michigan, the Court decided in one particular area, a violation
of a constitutional knock and announce rule, that the exclusionar1 rule
should not be applied as a remedy for the violation in question. The
reason that the Court limited its holding was Justice Anthony Kennedy.
In an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment,
Kennedy declared that he was deciding only that one case and was not
ready to dispense with the exclusionary rule.s8 A subsequent case, HerringV " 39
United States , confirmed that at least four current Justices are raising
the volume of their criticism of the exclusionary rule.
If a fifth Justice were appointed who agreed with Justices Scalia and
Thomas that the exclusionary rule should be thrown out, Mapp v. Ohio
could disappear. The question for the federal courts would then be
whether the pre-Mapp v. Ohio decision in Weeks v. United States, which
applied the exclusionary rule to federal court proceedings in 1914,
4
0
would continue to govern in federal court, or whether Congress would be
free to decide to adopt some other remedy instead. Federal criminal
proceedings conducted in a world with no exclusionary rule, if that were
to come to pass, would indeed be very different.
The election of Barack Obama may make that scenario less likely. If
future nominees change the composition of the Supreme Court in the
more liberal direction, the Court might rescind some of the post-Warren
Court exceptions and broaden the scope of criminal procedure
guarantees once again. If enough Justices shared Justice Powell's concern
about the dilution of rights in federal court, another interesting
alternative might be for the Supreme Court to adopt the two-tiered
constitutional criminal procedure structure that the Warren Court
rejected: full Bill of Rights protections for federal criminal defendants
and a lesser threshold for state defendants (which could then be
amplified by the individual states).
In terms of predictions, therefore, it is possible that the future will
hold some sort of revolution-instead of just evolution-with respect to
the constitutional criminal procedure legacy of the Warren Court.
547 U.S. 586, 599-602 (2006).
' Id.
Id. at 602-03 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
129 S. Ct. 695 (2009).
4' 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).
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It is also important to consider that the Warren Court did not have a
monopoly on revolution in the criminal procedure area. Just in the past
decade, the Supreme Court, under the leadership first of Chief Justice
William Rehnquist and then under Chief Justice John Roberts, has
revolutionized a number of criminal procedure rights, expanding them
in ways that the Warren Court never even considered. In Crawford v.
Washington, for example, the Supreme Court, led by Justice Antonin
Scalia, completely renovated the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation
Clause.41 United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez found, for the first time, that the
Sixth Amendment contains a right to counsel of one's choice, at least in
some respects, in another opinion written by Justice Scalia. A number
of recent decisions have expanded the reach of the Eighth Amendment's
ban on cruel and unusual punishment. The Rehnquist Court decided
first, in Atkins v. Virginia, that it is cruel and unusual to execute people
retarded. Then in Roper v. Simmons, the Court decidedw h o are m en ta lly re a d d . T e n R  r v S m o s h o r e i e
that it is cruel and unusual to execute people who were juveniles at the
time their crimes were committed. 4 Finally, just this last term, in Kennedy
v. Louisiana, the Roberts Court (in an opinion eponymously written by
Justice Kennedy) held that it is cruel and unusual to execute people for
• • 45
crimes against individuals other than homicide. Those are all very
major decisions, and could be joined in the future by a similarly-reasoned
decision that it is cruel and unusual punishment to execute the mentally
ill.
46
Will this revolution continue? Twenty years ago, few would have
predicted that the Supreme Court was likely to be expanding rights in
constitutional criminal procedure at all. That crystal ball, despite the very
recent shift in politics in the Congress and the Presidency, is cloudy.
IV. SENTENCING
In 1968, the indeterminate model of sentencing prevailed. Judges
had a good deal of discretion in sentencing. Parole boards also exercised
considerable discretion in deciding when someone given an
indeterminate sentence would be released, because one of the purposes
of punishment was thought to be rehabilitation. Deciding what was
4' 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
42 548 U.S. 140, 146 (2006).
13 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (although Chief Justice Rehnquist himself dissented
in Atkins, id. at 321).
"' 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005).
15 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2650-51 (2008) (again, the Chief Justice, now John Roberts,
was in dissent, id. at 2665 (Alito, J., dissenting, joined by Roberts, CJ., and Scalia and
Thomas,JJ.)).
46 See, e.g., John H. Blume & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Killing the Non-Willing Atkins,
the Volitionally Incapacitated, and the Death Penalty, 55 S.C. L. REV. 93, 131-32, 143
(2003); Douglas Mossman, Atkins v. Virginia: A Psychiatric Can of Worms, 33 N.M. L.
Rev. 255, 289 (2003).
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required to rehabilitate an offender, and when rehabilitation had
occurred, were highly individualized determinations. By 1988, Congress
had passed the Sentencing Reform Act47 and the age of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines 8 had begun. The Guidelines limited judicial
discretion in sentencing in order to reduce some of the disparities that
had occurred under individualized sentencing-disparities contingent
on which judge happened to set the sentence. But the Guidelines
changed more than that. They changed what district judges do in
sentencing, requiring judges to spend a lot more time to find facts, to
look at long presentence reports, and perhaps to employ software to
enable them to sentence under a complex grid.4 9 The Guidelines also
involved appellate judges in sentencing to a much greater extent, as the
appellate courts were given the task of ensuring that district judges were
following the guidelines. This was a major shift that took some judges
quite a while to absorb.
During the past decade, the Supreme Court held its own counter-
revolution and totally overhauled the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 5
Beginning with Apprendi v. New Jersey, 1 in 2000, following with Blakely v.
Washington,52 in 2004, and finally addressing the Guidelines directly in
United States v. Booker, 3 in 2005, the Supreme Court held that the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines were unconstitutional on the theory that they
violated the Sixth Amendment right of a criminal defendant to have a
jury decide the facts on which the sentence would be based. In a
procrustean compromise, the Court then saved the Guidelines by
declaring that henceforth they would only be advisory. 4 As a result,
district judges once again have greater discretion in sentencing. The
Booker decision also changed the scope of appellate review from the very
specific question Courts of Appeals were asked under the Guidelines-
whether the district judges were following the Guidelines-to the very
general question of whether the sentence imposed was "reasonable." As
in the Sixth Amendment cases described above, Justices considered to be
conservative, like Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, were among the
leaders of this revolution.
The federal courts are still in the process of adjusting to the
aftermath of the Booker decision. Decisions of the Supreme Court in its
41 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551 et. seq. (2006).
41 U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, introductory
cmt. (2008).
41 Susan N. Herman, The Tail That Wagged the Dog: Bifurcated Fact-Finding Under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Limits of Due Process, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 289, 310 n.80
(1992).
0 Susan N. Herman, Applying Apprendi to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: You Say
You Want a Revolution?, 87 IOwA L. REv. 615 (2002).
-" 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
52 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004).
-3 543 U.S. 220, 226-27, 244 (2005).
4 Id. at 227.
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most recently completed 2007-2008 term, in the Gall v. United States5' and
the Kimbrough v. United States6 cases, settle some of the open questions
that divided the lower courts after Booker. The Supreme Court has begun
to offer the Courts of Appeals more precise instructions about how to
conduct appellate review of sentences under the new regime. So it seems
that sentencing is beginning to normalize and stabilize in the federal
courts. However, a number of questions remain, including: one, will
sentences go up or down now that sentencing judges have more
discretion, and two, what will happen to appeals once defendants learn
that the appellate courts are reviewing their sentences only on a forgiving
abuse of discretion standard? Will the number of appeals of sentences go
down?
There are many other questions raised by this brave new world of
federal sentencing, but the biggest question of all, looming over this
whole area, is whether or not Congress is going to get into the act. So far,
Congress has left the Booker revolution alone and has left the federal
judges to paddle their own canoes. But while paddling, many continue to
look over their shoulders at Congress, wondering whether or not, at
some point, Congress is going to make what has been a decision for the
courts into a political decision and change the current. Politics will
determine whether the United States v. Booker compromise remains stable.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, on the basis of the past forty years, I can comfortably
predict that there will indeed be changes in the nature, volume, and
challenges in federal criminal litigation, including challenges for the
Federal Judicial Center. Even after the election of Barack Obama, just
what those changes will be remains, at this point, unpredictable.
5 128 S. Ct. 586, 594-95 (2007).
5 128 S. Ct. 558, 564 (2007).

